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MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP

Efforts at Political Reconciliation

I. BACKGROUND

Political. The GOR has repeatedly stated it will not negotiate with those who participated in the genocide. According to their list of 220 "ringleaders", this would include all members of the ex-IGOR in Zaire. In response to numerous approaches by USG officials, the GOR has also repeatedly insisted that moderate MRND members had been approached but had refused cabinet positions. The current cabinet of 22 includes 5 parties (9 RPF, 4 MDR, 3 Liberal Party, 3 Social Democratic Party, 1 Christian Democratic Party and 2 non-affiliated). On November 15, the GOR redistributed to these parties and three others all 19 parliamentary seats reserved in the Arusha accords for the MRND and 8 other parties now banned due to alleged participation in the genocide. On the local level, civilians are gradually replacing RPA officials; nearly all military prefects (Gikongoro being a notable exception) have now been replaced by civilians. The GOR has stated its commitment to include officials from a number of parties, although not the former incumbents nor any MRND members, as far as we know.

Military. The RPA has undertaken a limited program to re-integrate ex-FAR troops into its ranks. According to our latest information, at least two thousand ex-FAR have been screened and are undergoing joint training with RPA soldiers;

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training includes a hefty "political education" component. The RPA has allowed relatively free but not unscheduled visits by international observers (including US embassy personnel) to the principal training site at Gako, south of Kigali. Of course, the test of RPA intentions will be the actual assignment of these soldiers, including officers, to active duty. The first training period, scheduled to last up to three months, is still ongoing. To date, the RPA has been reluctant to make any commitment regarding reassignment of officers. Ex-FAR recruits acceptable to the RPA are bound to be few as long as ex-IGOR/ex-FAR demonstrate intentions to retake the country or to achieve negotiations through military pressure. Likewise, demobilization is for the foreseeable future a non-starter.

Internal security and human rights. In addition to the concern over the external threat is the RPA's conviction that the Interahamwe militia has infiltrated and is now controlling the internally displaced camps, particularly in the southwest (former French Turquoise zone). This has led in recent weeks to aggressive RPA action to disband those camps. The most recent incident - the burning of Musenge Camp in Gikongoro prefecture - resulted in seven deaths. These incidents and continuing reports of reprisal killings and other human rights violations by the RPA or Tutsi civilians are severely hampering repatriation/resettlement efforts, with obvious negative consequences for national reconciliation.

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## II. TALKING POINTS

- o It is vital to address the issue of genocide and to begin to deal with the problems of camp security and voluntary repatriation before lasting political reconciliation can be achieved.
  - We should therefore energetically promote the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal and the proposed Regional Refugee Conference.
  
- o We should also support efforts by SRSG Khan and Special Regional Envoy Dillon to foster regional cooperation in promoting political reconciliation.
  - We expect that this would eventually include political dialogue between the GOR and ex-government moderates, and a return to the Arusha framework, although probably not the precise letter of the accords.
  - While we would welcome this dialogue, we should not condition support for the GOR on willingness to undertake direct political talks now.
  
- o We should continue to urge the GOR to broaden its political base at both the national and local levels. This would include the appointing of moderate MRND and other non-RPF party members to local positions.
  
- o We can also encourage the RPA to expand its program to reintegrate ex-FAR soldiers, and to publicize this effort (jointly with UNAMIR radio, once operational).

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